Bullpen Management

Hasn't this bullpen been mismanaged long enough? Not by the managers but by the front office.

John Parrish just doesn't have what it takes to be a major league pitcher. He has a live arm, you have to admit, as evidenced by 33 strikeouts in 34 innings. That's a pretty good way to keep a job as a reliever. But unfortunately he's also allowed a ghastly 28 walks on the year.

And that's not something new. In 211 1/3 career innings, he's walked 160. That's good for 6.81 BB/9. Even if you can blow it by batters as well as John Parrish, you have to have some basic level of control. Parrish doesn't have that, despite spending parts of six seasons with the Orioles dating back to 2000. He's never had it, and considering he's now 29, at what point does the organization realize it's finally time to cut bait? Parrish just isn't a major league caliber pitcher. Guys with a 5.82 ERA in middle relief, especially those with little prior track record, are imminently expendable.

Paul Shuey hasn't pitched in the big leagues since 2003 before his call-up to Baltimore last month. He's good enough as bullpen filler for Norfolk, an experienced pitcher to step in and provide some innings in case of emergency pending his performance in AAA, although given that Shuey is 36, there doesn't seem to be much of a need to try to resurrect his career in the bigs.

But Shuey wasn't good in Norfolk, posting a 4.70 ERA (although in fairness his peripherals were strong). Considering that he had pitched in just six games in organized baseball from 2004-2006, what reason was there to promote Shuey? None, other than his performance from years ago when he was a very good middle reliever. So far Shuey has rewarded the Orioles with a 6.11 ERA in 11 appearances.

If the Orioles didn't have any options, maybe that would be acceptable (though you'd have to wonder why these two were the best relief options they could come up with). But there are options. Here are two:

Corey Doyne: 1.91 ERA/42.3 IP/47 K/14 BB/0 HR (age 25)
James Hoey: 0.72 ERA/ 37.3 IP/53 K/ 9 BB/ 1 HR (age 24)

Doyne put up those numbers at Norfolk while Hoey split the season between Bowie and the Tides.

Is this a small thing? Relatively speaking, it is. But it's also illustrative of the team's failures. In at least three areas

1) Relying on veterans and experience over youth, talent, and performance

It's the tendency of the Flanagan & Duquette to go with the veteran rather than the young guy who is likely to outperform him. Doyne and Hoey both pitched better than Shuey in the minors this season, but yet Shuey is the one member of the trio on the current major league roster.

It might be understandable if the young guys were 20 or 21, or the team were in the heat of the pennant race, but that's not the case. Hoey and Doyne are both in their mid-20s and as ready as they'll ever be to contribute in a major league bullpen. And in a season where the Orioles are once again miles out of the race, why are innings being given to a retread like Shuey rather than guys who might possibly be part of the team the next time the Orioles contend?

2) Poor roster management/planning

Hoey and Doyne did get a shot with the Orioles this season. They were called up and combined to throw one inning before being sent back down to Norfolk. You have to wonder what the Front Office was thinking in calling these guys up only to promptly shuttle them back to Norfolk before either could pitch a full major league inning.

Was it a lack of patience? Was it a move that wasn't thoroughly considered before it was executed? Either way, it speaks to the lack of planning to call these two up for two days, only to send them down for Rob Bell and Paul Shuey.

3) Holding on too long

I had no problem with having John Parrish on the opening day roster. He had, after all, posted an ERA well better than the league average over 84 appearances from 2003-2005. Even taking into account the control problems, that's enough for him to make the roster, especially considering his affordable six figure salary. But at some time it's time to make the realization that he just doesn't have it.

It's similar to the way the Orioles handled Todd Williams. He gave them solid relief work off of the scrap heap in 2005 despite poor peripheral numbers that forecasted a drop off. He was understandably brought back for 2006 where he struggled in posting a 4.74 ERA over in 62 appearances. But despite being 36, the Orioles brought him back to the organization calling him up long enough to post a 7.53 ERA in 14 games.

Instead of realizing that pitchers like Todd Williams and John Parrish are a dime a dozen and can be replaced, the team has held onto them as if they are valuable commodities worth trying to rehabilitate. And that's a problem.

Chris Ray

Before the 2007 season, there was a general agreement that the Orioles had found their closer. It was deemed in the spring of '06 that Chris Ray would be the replacement for the departed BJ Ryan. Ray rewarded the organization for its confidence with a nifty 2.73 ERA in 66 IP, converting 33 saves in 38 chances.

But while others were singing his praises, I was more than a little worried about Ray's future in the closer role. His peripheral numbers were simply not that good in 2006. He was an extreme fly-ball pitcher with a tendency to give up lots of walks. His strikeout rate was good, but not good enough to compensate for his deficiencies in other areas. But an unsustainable .197 BABIP muted the effects of the poor peripherals. Well, not totally. Ray did give up a whopping 10 HR on the season which caused some concern. But in the minds of many, results were results, and Ray was getting the needed results even with his propensity to give up the longball.

Ray did struggle early in the season in terms of his ERA, but by mid-May he had lowered his ERA to 3.44. That number was inflated by two appearances where he gave up a combined 7 runs. Indeed Ray was unscored upon in his other 16 appearances. More importantly, Ray was giving up fewer fly balls and had a sterling 18:2 K:BB ration through 18 1/3 IP.

But the next 18 1/3 innings were not nearly as kind. In his very next appearance Ray retired just one batter and his ERA rose by nearly a full point. In 19 appearances over that span, Ray compiled a 6.87 ERA, driven by a nasty 15:13 K:BB ratio.

However since that terrible stretch, Ray has made five appearances totaling five innings. In those five innings of work he hasn't surrendered a run, has struck out 10, and has walked just two (including no walks in four of his five appearances).

It's tough to know the reason for the up and down performances by Ray this year. Obviously the fluctuations in the walk rate has been the major change throughout the season. My eyes told me that Ray has been doing a better job attacking the strike zone in his past five games, so I decided to check the data.

In his first 18 games, Ray threw a stellar 66.1% of his 298 pitches for strikes. In the second portion of the season, that number dropped to 60.8% of 358 pitches (notice the need for 60 more pitches to complete the same number of innings). But in this third leg of the season the number has risen back to only 62.9% in 81 pitches. That's not bad at all, but it isn't as good as it was early in the season.

Maybe it's just the perils of small sample size. Ray could end the year with a sub-3 ERA or with one that climbs back over 5.00. But for now, it might be best to have a little patience with Ray's struggles because he is on the right track.

Where we stand

In my last post, I took a look at where the Orioles really stand so far this season and why there might be cause for optimism. But even the most optimistic view (third order wins) sees the team topping out at somewhere around 87 or 88 wins. Any Orioles fan would be happy if the team managed to win that many games this season, but it's not enough to make the playoffs. Indeed an AL East team would have needed to win at least 95 games in each of the past six seasons to make the playoffs. Not since the Yankees won the division at 87-74 in 2000 would fewer wins have done the trick.

So clearly with improvement necessary, we must evaluate what the team has for next season, and at what prices. Following is a look at all players under the team's control for the 2008 season.

Free Agents:

SS Miguel Tejada ($13M)
3B Melvin Mora (~$8.6M)
1B/DH Aubrey Huff ($8M)
C Ramon Hernandez ($7.5M)
2B Brian Roberts ($6.3M)
LF/DH Jay Gibbons ($5.7M)
LF/CF Jay Payton ($5M)
RP Danys Baez ($4.5M)
RP Jamie Walker ($4.5M)
RP Chad Bradford ($3.5M)

Subtotal: $67.6M

Options
SP Kris Benson ($7.5M Club, $0.5M buyout)
SP Steve Trachsel ($4.75M Club, $0.1M buyout)
1B/DH Kevin Millar ($2.75M Vesting)

Subtotal: $3.35M (estimated)

Arbitration

SP Erik Bedard ($5.5M, estimated)
SP Daniel Cabrera ($2.5M, estimated)
RP Chris Ray ($1M, estimated, assuming Super 2 status)

Subtotal: $9M

Pre-Arbitration

SP Adam Loewen (~$400k)
SP Jeremy Guthrie (~$400k)
RF Nick Markakis (~400k)

Subtotal: $1.2M

That's not exactly a pretty picture. The team has 17 players under contract next season - 4 starters, 4 relievers, and 9 position players - for a total of $81.15. They will also add some mix of Brian Burres, Garrett Olson, JR House, Jon Knott, James Hoey, Corey Doyne, and Nolan Reimold to the 25 man roster after camp breaks next year. None of those players are assured of a spot at this point, but all are somewhat attractive options, partly because none of those players will be eligible to arbitration for several seasons.

But the problem with the current roster construction should already be quite apparent at this point. The team has locked up an offensive core that is not close to being productive enough for the team to contend.

A modest upgrade could be expected if the team does a better job of roster management. Taking at-bats from Paul Bako, Brandon Fahey, Luis Hernandez, Alberto Castillo and other offensive dregs and assigning them to Jon Knott, JR House, or even Nolan Reimold could provide a small but cheap boon to the offense.

Modest bounce back seasons might be within reach for Ramon Hernandez, Miguel Tejada, and Aubrey Huff, but those could easily be offset from declines by Melvin Mora, Kevin Millar, and Jay Payton, all of whom will be 35 or older next season.

With this seasons' opening day payroll at $89.5M, there will be little room for meaningful free agent upgrades unless Peter Angelos decides to reach deeper in his pockets. Call me an optimist, but given the sizable increase in payroll this season, that just might happen. But unless the upgrade in payroll is substantial, the team will be far out of the running for any top-dollar free-agents. One can argue the merits of going after high dollar free agents - and I'd tend to agree - but the alternative of continuing to sign mediocre vets on the decline isn't particularly attractive.

The path seems clear enough. Andy MacPhail must work on a plan where some of the seven-figure veterans are traded and replaced with cheaper solutions, or more expensive, but smarter solutions. Yet that's easier said than done. Of the players locked up to long-term deals, Payton, Huff, Gibbons, Mora, and Baez are all unmovable because their contracts are paired with mediocre (or worse) performance.

Walker and Bradford have performed well, and might be able to be traded for small returns. And given the volatility of relievers and their small workloads, the Orioles would be wise to work hard to find a team that will accept their contracts at the upcoming trade deadline where relievers are likely to be at more of a premium than in the offseason.

More likely the team needs to trade Tejada, freeing up a substantial amount of payroll while likely still getting a useful part or two back. As painful as it might be, a trade of Brian Roberts has to be on the table if the team can get multiple high quality young players.

Andy MacPhail walks into a tough situation. While some solutions seem obvious to me (adding Knott and House, trading Tejada), there is no quick fix. MacPhail can only right the ship by crafting a detailed plan and adhering to it. A plan which, most importantly, stops the over reliance on mediocre veterans whose most attractive quality is the familiarity of their name.

Optimism?

With Consecutive Losing Season Number 10 on the horizon, Orioles fans naturally turn their attention to the question of how to fix things. But one question that has to be asked is "how far away from contending is this team?". To that end it's worth looking deeper about where the team stands today.

The team currently sits at 38-49, but it's possible that the situation isn't quite as dire as that record indicates. That record is fueled by a ridiculously bad 8-18 record in one-run games. A team's record in one run games is largely - though not completely - a product of random chance rather than some peculiar inability to play well in pressure situations. That 8-18 record is worse than every team in the majors aside from the Yankees and the Phillies. Even worse, the team is tied with the Padres for most one-run losses. But given that no team has finished with a worse record in one run games in the past three seasons, it seems likely that the Orioles will regress towards the mean in this department in the second half.

The team's Pythagorean Record, an expected record based on runs scored and runs allowed, puts the team at 42-45. Not good certainly, but a modest improvement, and certainly closer to respectability. It certainly shows to some extent how the team's record is colored by its performance in close games.

But even better are the team's "third order" wins. Third order wins are generated in a similar manner as Pythagorean wins and losses, however instead of using runs scored and allowed, equivalent runs scored (EqR) and equivalent runs allowed (EqRA) are used. EqR and EqRA are generated using a team's batting line (and opponent's batting line for EqRA) in order to determine how many runs a team "should" have allowed or given up, a number adjusted for strength of schedule (which actually results in AEqR and AEqRA). In this calculation, the Orioles are credited with 23 additional runs scored and 17 fewer runs allowed, vaulting their "expected" record up to a touch better than 47-40.

What does any of this mean? We know that both of these adjust records will do a better job of predicting the future than will the team's current unadjusted record. So from here on out we can expect the team to play more like one which won 45 or so games in the first half rather than one which won 38 -- assuming the roster remains the same, of course.

But that doesn't matter much for this year, except for pride. Even if the team went 15 games over .500 over the final 75 games it would only get them to a shade above .500 at 83-79. That's a point of pride if you're one of the worst franchises in baseball but not if you hope to play meaningful games after the All-Star break. No, the real utility in these advanced measures is for looking at next season as a tool to assess what the Orioles need to do in the offseason. I'll try to tackle that next time.